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Introduction 		
For some decades now, literature on punishment has tried to account for ‘mass incarceration’ and ‘Western punitiveness’. In this literature punishment is presumed to have increased, and its harshness intensified, in response to macroscopic cultural and economic transformations (Garland, 2001; Simon, 2007; Wacquant, 2009). By contrast, academic attention has more recently been directed to the possibility that ‘punitiveness’ may not be the only contemporary penal scenario, and that existing institutional structures, in different contexts, in fact sustain penal moderation. Comparative analyses of punishment (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006; Tonry, 2007; Lacey 2008; Lappi-Seppälä, 2008), as well as analyses focusing on specific Western polities - ‘country-specific deviation[s]’ (Lappi-Seppälä , 2008: 314) - have suggested that diverse penal realities exist (see Downes, 1988, Pratt, 2008a; 2008b; Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2010; Sozzo, 2011; Pratt and Eriksson, 2013). Here I follow this second line of scholarship by focusing on contemporary Italy, analysing it as a critical case study against which to test prominent theories of Western punishment​[1]​.
In this article I argue that Italy challenges narratives of increasing Western punitiveness and, to some extent, also challenges narratives of penal moderation. In identifying these ‘Italian challenges’, I bolster the case for national-specific penal analyses. Punishment should be seen as deeply ‘embedded’ in the ‘specific environment’ that produces it (Melossi, 2001: 407) and national penality should be taken on its own terms: as comparative research teaches, we cannot assume that all penal contexts can be subsumed in undifferentiated, macroscopic narratives (Lappi-Seppälä, 2008: 313-14; Tonry, 2007: 1). Yet accepting that punishment is ‘nationally specific’ does not condemn us to national analyses alone. Comparative research points to the possibility of setting up a ‘conversation’ between macroscopic narratives and national case-studies, testing and refining the former’s hypotheses against the latter, to yield ever more precise accounts of contemporary penality (Jones and Newburn, 2005: 59). Pursuing this last argument, I lay out my hypothesis on how we can systematise – explain and not just describe – Italian penality, and relate it to existing theories of Western punishment. Based on the ‘challenges’ that the Italian case provides, I identify politics – political culture, political dynamics, political institutions – as an organising principle for Italian penality. The article thus aims to identify a method with which to explain the Italian case study, a method that will also allow us to place Italy in conversation with existing theories of Western punishment. 
This article is structured as follows: I first analyse Italian penality, characterising it as one in which repression and leniency co-exist and alternate. I then analyse Italian penal reform and legislation, arguing that they embody both punitiveness and moderation. In the following section, I explore the issue of waning state sovereignty and its presumed contribution to increasing punitiveness (Garland 2001). I argue that the evolution of the Italian state does not fit this narrative: Italy is a contested state, in which the formal criminal law can be side-lined by informal norms, at the same time as the law is used as a tool to bolster state authority. I subsequently ask whether Italian penality can be explained by reference to the nation’s political economy. I argue that the latter’s hybridity in fact challenges the methodological approach that predicts punitiveness or moderation by reference to political economic evolution. With its ‘mixed’ economy, Italy cannot be seen as an instance of the ‘punitiveness’ of contemporary ‘post-Fordism’ (De Giorgi, 2006). Neither can it be slotted into the analysis that correlates penal divergence to different ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Lacey, 2008; 2011; Hall and Soskice, 2001): the Italian political economy sits between the more punitive ‘liberal market economies’ and the more moderate ‘co-ordinated market economies’. As the article progresses I identify the political dimension to all of these ‘challenges’ to Western punitiveness. I conclude by hypothesising that politics thereby emerges as the key organising principle with which to craft a mid-level analysis of Italian penality. I further suggest that this analysis can help us advance the debate on contemporary Western punishment, and on the conditions of punitiveness and moderation across contexts.

Italian penality – punitiveness and moderation
Penal dualism and differentiation
Italian penality seems to defy easy classification: Western punishment has been analysed in terms of punitiveness and, where there has been attention to comparative penal divergence, in terms of its presumed opposite  - penal moderation. To a certain extent, the terms ‘punitiveness’ and ‘moderation’ are inevitably a simplification: shorthand for predominant, bird’s eye-view, penal trends. Even as explanatory shorthand, however, the choice between ‘punitiveness’ and ‘moderation’ seems not to suit Italy. Using the, limited (Solivetti, 2010: 146) but useful, proxy of prison rates (Nelken, 2005, 221; 2010) we see for example that Italian rates have fluctuated over the years, and though there has been a background increase in incarceration since 1970, amplified particularly after 1990, this increase has been dotted by repeat amnesties (Figure 1). 
This fluctuation in imprisonment cannot be explained simply as a consequence of fluctuating crime rates. Italian crime rates over the period in question have followed a trajectory similar to the one described by Tonry for ‘most European countries’: rising ‘from the 1960s through the early to mid 1990s and after that [falling, or stabilizing, or alternating] between decline and stability’ (2007: 2)​[2]​. From the mid 1970s onwards, Italian homicide rates (a better measure of comparative crime: Barclay and Tavares, 2002) also appear to have followed trends similar to those visible in other European nations (Barbagli, 2004: 146-147; Solivetti, 2013: 95): peaking during the course of the 1980s and early 1990s, and decreasing therefrom​[3]​.  
The overall similarity across European crime rates and homicide rates, combined with divergence in European incarceration rates, suggests that no simple relation exists between crime and punishment – in Italy or elsewhere – such that changing crime levels are necessarily or automatically linked to changing imprisonment levels (Tonry, 2007: 3, 5, 16-17; also Barker, 2009: 4). This should not be taken to mean that crime has had no effect on Italian punishment. However, it does suggest that no mechanical link can be drawn between Italian crime levels and imprisonment, particularly where crime is taken in the aggregate. Where crime features in this article it therefore does so not in quantitative terms, but in relation to the salience of particular forms of crime, and the latter’s impact upon the enactment and evolution of Italian penal policy.
Italy’s prison rates – fluctuating over time, with a background increase but repeat clemency provisions – suggest that overall Italy does not replicate the ‘punitiveness’ of nations such as the UK and, in a much more extreme fashion, the US. Neither does Italy display the ‘moderation’ of nations such as Germany, the archetypal co-ordinated market economy of Nicola Lacey’s analysis, whose penal stability reflects the incentives of Germany’s ‘interlocking’ (2008: 61) institutional structure. Imprisonment is here a particularly useful measure for gauging comparative penal severity, insofar as it is ‘readily available, is calculated more or less consistently over time and space, and is a measure of the diverse practices and policies that collectively result in the State imposing […] suffering on its residents in the name of deserved punishment and crime prevention’ (Tonry, 2007: 7; also Lappi-Seppälä, 2008: 330; Barker, 2009: 14). Moreover, Western European prison rates have been found to correlate strongly with alternative measures of ‘punitiveness’ (for example imprisonment rates related to crime levels: Lappi-Seppälä, 2008: 331)​[4]​.  
However, mindful that no single measure can adequately capture ‘punitiveness’ (Tonry, 2007: 5; Lappi-Seppälä, 2008: 330) I expand my analysis outward from imprisonment, to include Italian penal enactments, ‘policies [and] practices’ (Tonry, 2007: 5). Examples include amnesties and pardons, or indeed the criminal justice provisions introduced to tackle terrorism and organised crime. This analysis leads me to argue that the alternation between punitiveness and moderation visible in Italian prison rates, is in fact a broader feature of Italian penality. The latter should be understood as oscillating between repression and leniency – with the two co-existing, rather than being mutually exclusive (Nelken, 2005: 219-221; see also Gallo, 2014: 5-7).  This ‘dualism’, or tension, between repression and leniency can be seen as a historical feature visible across penal reform and legislation (Padovani, 1981: 93). If we are to use the term ‘punitiveness’ in relation to Italy we therefore need to qualify it as ‘differential’, where this indicates the unequal distribution of punishment. Moderation itself can be seen as similarly ‘differentiated’. In this section I address the ‘dualism’ and ‘differentiation’ of Italian penality, briefly analysing differentiation of punishment by nationality, and then discussing Catholicism and the Left-wing ideologies that have shaped punishment in contemporary Italy. The latter analysis points to the differentiation of punitiveness and moderation by types of crime, each calling into play different – formal and informal – types of conflict resolution.







Figure I. Prison rates in Italy and England & Wales, including Italian clemency provisions.
Sources: Italy - author’s elaboration from ISTAT – Annuari di Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali (1970-2000), I detenuti nelle carceri Italiane: Anno 2013 (2015) and ISTAT – Demo, Geodemo (accessed October 2009). England and Wales - author’s elaboration from HMSO (1980); HO (1984, 1986, 1987); White et al (2000); Berman and Dar (2013); ONS Population Statistics (1970-2010)​[7]​.

Differentiation is not only visible in relation to nationality: in Italy, harsh punishment may also be contingent upon the type of crime that is being dealt with. As David Nelken notes, attention in Italy has often been directed to crimes against the state, such as internal terrorism, organised crime, and political corruption. For much of the post-war period these crimes, that broadly speaking threaten the state’s integrity, have had greater salience than ordinary crimes  (Nelken, 2005: 225; 2014: 282; Pavarini, 1994)​[8]​. This may also be why individual victims, so central to Anglo-American penal discourse (Garland, 2001; Simon, 2007), do not occupy a prominent position in Italian penality. The limited role victims occupy is, to some extent, also a result of the Catholic influence on Italian society: Catholicism teaches that it is victims’ role to forgive rather than seek revenge or retribution (Nelken 2010: 68). Thus Italy has not truly experienced those aspects of ‘Western punitiveness’ thought to follow from an attention to victims of crime, where the latter are ‘abstracted’ and made into symbols of contemporary fears (Garland, 2001: 11; 143-44). 
Catholicism has for many years been one of Italy’s dominant ideologies, and arguably remains so today despite the dissolution of its most ‘direct’ party political representative – the Christian Democratic Party (DC) – in the 1990s. With its emphasis on social responsibility and solidarity (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006: 140) Catholicism has stood in the way of ‘untrammelled’ punitiveness. This is also because of its emphasis on personal morality and repentance, preferred over state intervention into social conflict, including conflicts created by deviance. As Ginsborg notes, the Italian Catholic Church’s approach to authority was based on ‘submission […] docility [and] mediation’ (2001: 103) with the DC practicing mediation, for example, through its patronage – clientelistic – relations. Patronage relations addressed ‘affairs of the state’ not through formal laws and procedures, but with a political patron mediating between clients and centres of power (Ginsborg, 2001: 103; Della Porta, 1992). I argue that the approach to law and authority inherent in clientelism also affected ways of addressing deviance: by reference to close, personalistic, informal norms, rather than formal penal norms and the incarceration that might follow. 
Echoes of Ginsborg’s account can be found in Dario Melossi’s characterization of Catholic attitudes to punishment and authority, marked by a ‘soft authoritarian paternalism’ (2001: 412): ‘soft’ is the tendency to resolve deviance informally, restoring the erring sheep back to the fold; ‘authoritarian’, is the reaction to any direct challenge to ‘religious or political hierarchies’ (2001: 412). The latter mark the limits of Catholic tolerance and penal moderation - Catholicism should not be taken as a straightforward purveyor of moderation - and ‘soft authoritarian paternalism’ further embodies the duality of Italian penality. The latter contains both incentives to repression and incentives to leniency, each called into play by different forms of deviance. According to Melossi, the ‘authoritarianism’ that co-exists alongside the ‘soft paternalism’, is triggered by challenges to established authority, and here we come back to Italy’s marked attention to crimes against the state rather than ordinary crimes: attacks against the state and its integrity rather than attacks against single victims. 
This tension between moderation and repression is also visible in the influence of Left-wing ideologies upon Italian penality, the ‘communitarianism’ that Cavadino and Dignan refer to as common to the DC and to the Italian Communist Party (PCI: 2006, p. 140). Alongside Catholicism, Italy possessed a strong Left-wing tradition, predominant in the post-war years and, with significant dilution, visible also in contemporary Italian politics. An emphasis on social solidarity derived from Italy’s Leftist ideologies, as from Catholicism, incentivizing the re-socialisation of economic marginality and of the deviance following therefrom: if penal solutions were sought to social conflict, they were likely to be re-integrative rather than geared to containment via incarceration (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006; Gonnella, 2013: 228; Nelken, 2014: 281). 
Born of the Leftist traditions, and antithetical to a (straightforward) ‘punitive’ attitude to deviance, is also what Pavarini has called a ‘political’ conception of crime. Pavarini links this conception to the incidence of political terrorism in Italy between (roughly) 1970 and the early 1980s (Pavarini, 1994: 415; Ruggiero, 2010a). Such a conception sees crime as a question of politics, and calls for a resolution by political – participatory ​– means rather than recourse to the criminal law. Overall, and to the extent that it influenced Italian citizens’ approaches to crime and punishment, this narrative can be seen as having reduced the criminal law’s purchase, i.e., the extent to which the criminal law was seen as the immediate solution to crime and deviance. This dynamic reduced the ‘punitiveness’ that follows from the deployment of formal penal censure and incarceration, an effect not dissimilar to that produced by Catholic incentives to ‘mediation’. Here the criminal law is side-lined in favour of alternative means of social-conflict resolution, whether political participation of Leftist inspiration, or informal social controls of Catholic derivation.
The ‘political’ conception of crime and punishment has not been static in time. Pavarini has pointed to the fact that after Italy’s 1990’s political crisis – the overhaul of the Italian political system in the wake of a large-scale corruption scandal (Tangentopoli: see Nelken, 1996), and the demise of the ‘great ideologies’ following the end of the Cold War - disillusionment with the political system caused a shift in public attitudes to crime and punishment. The shift was away from political solutions towards increasing demands for, and levels of, formal punishment ‘invoked socially and sanctioned institutionally’ (Pavarini, 1994: 53). However, Pavarini’s analysis of a ‘new [Italian] penology’ is not unequivocal, at least insofar as it posits Italy’s alignment with – more recognizably ‘Anglo-American’ – scenarios of ‘law and order’. Italian penality has in fact still displayed a potential for moderation, though the conditions of moderation may now be less linked to political participation as such, and more to the existence of personalistic, lato sensu political, methods of incentivizing moderation. Thus, the apparent upsurge in formal punishment since 1990 should be seen as developing together with persisting incentives to moderation, though the latter may now follow more from mediation and informal social controls than from political engagement of a ‘public’ nature.
In terms of the overall discussion of Italy’s penal dualism it is also important to note that, even before the political crisis of the 1990s, the penal incentives that derived from the Left had not been straightforward: we find a tension here as we did in relation to Catholicism. So, if social solidarity and political interpretations of crime were though to follow from Left-wing ideologies, as they influenced Italian society, the same could not be said of the penal incentives following from the Communist party (PCI), particularly in its approach to (right and left wing) political terrorism (Ferrajoli, 1994; Ginsborg, 1990: 380-386 esp. 380; Vittoria, 2006: 137-139). According to Pavarini (1997: 77), Left-wing parties seem to have ‘made the decisive thrust […] in shaping’ penal and procedural reforms aimed against terrorism, compensating for ‘moderate and conservative parties’ reluctance to commit themselves on criminal policy issues’ (also Pavarini, 1994; Pizzorno, 1997: 325-332; Bricola, 1981: 8; Gonnella, 2013: 226) ​[9]​. As I will explain in the next section, such reforms can be seen as having created a punitive potential in Italy, with repression engendered by, but not limited to, the terrorist emergency. We thus have another example of Italy’s penal dualism – here originating from left-wing ideologies and their party articulation – and reflected in the broader oscillation between punitiveness and moderation. Notice how the originating moment of repression is once again the threat to state authority, suggesting that this is a recurring feature of Italy’s differential distribution of punishment. 
	
Penal emergencies, penal reforms: potential punitiveness and contingent moderation.
Italian penality has been influenced by the need to address ‘emergencies’ such as terrorism (during the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s) and organised crime (especially as of the 1980s – for its effects on homicide rates see Barbagli, 2004: 147). The tools used to tackle these ‘emergencies’ have included instruments already present in the Italian penal code – the Rocco Code – dating from the 1930s, subject only to piecemeal legislation since then, and bearing marks of the authoritarian regime under which it was first passed (Skinner, 2011; Pires Marques, 2013). The Rocco Code still carries the possibility of ‘draconian prison sentences’ (Pavarini, 1994: 49), a potential harshness magnified by Italy’s over-reliance on penal legislation (Maiello, 1997: 94; Nelken, 2005: 225).  Emergencies have, however, also been tackled via ‘special’ laws. The latter have created a potential for punitiveness, in relation to their direct targets but also because of their broader impact: a ‘halo effect’ with formal repression spreading outwards, as emergency provisions persisted beyond the emergency for which they were introduced (La Greca, 2005: 48; Pavarini, 1994: 59; 1997: 84-85; Ruggiero, 1998: 216; see also Gallo, 2014: 14). 
How is this ‘halo effect’ thought to work? Looking across the examples provided in the literature, it appears that the argument is one of conditioning of the judiciary in their application of criminal law and procedure. Writing in 1981, for example, Franco Bricola noted how the widening interpretation of attempts (art 56 c.p.) within the context of emergency laws, was likely to impact upon the interpretation of attempts in non-emergency contexts (1981: 22)​[10]​. The specific details of this example have been superseded by contemporary jurisprudence.​[11]​ However the general mechanism described by Bricola remains significant in understanding the ‘halo effect’: the conditioning of the judiciary to (in/advertently) interpret criminal law through an ‘emergency-lens’, and the consequent contraction of overall procedural guarantees (1981: 22; Ferrajoli, 1996: 71; 2011: 857)​[12]​. 
Bricola argues that emergency laws also reveal an instrumental approach to punishment, with punishment used as means to impose social control, and to ‘intimidate’ individuals seen to threaten established authority (1981: 23). ‘Instrumental’, in this analysis, seems to be the judiciary’s use of emergency legislation, as judges and prosecutors pursued their mandate to repress terrorism and organised crime. Instrumental is also the political class, whose reforms in matters of emergencies delegated the latter’s resolution to the judiciary (Ferrajoli, 1996: 71; Della Porta, 2001: 14; Gallo, 2014): increasing judicial discretion via insufficiently precise legislative provisions (Padovani, 1981: 93), and ultimately relying on the criminal law rather than attempting to address the root causes of Italy’s emergencies. This argument seems to imply an excess (and unprincipled) use of the criminal law and penal sanctions, where the latter were used as a stop-gap solution to structural problems, causing a consequent increase in overall levels of punishment.
The ‘halo effect’ can further be illustrated by analysing ‘preventive’ or ‘precautionary’ custody, roughly remand in prison (Libro IV, Titolo I, c.p.p.), whose terms and duration were extended in 1974 and successive years. Preventive custody has been used against Italy’s emergencies (De Vito, 2009: 95; Bricola, 1981: 12) employed, Luigi Stortoni explains, as a bargaining tool with which to obtain cooperation from ‘repentant’ terrorist and organised criminals. Stortoni further claims that the use of preventive custody later transformed into a more generalised praxis (in Rinaldi 1992: 96 note 33; see also Gallo 2014: 14): though ‘softened’ in the early 1990s, the legal institution has persisted beyond the terrorism and organised crime emergencies (Della Porta, 2001: 14). Preventive custody has inflated prison rates to the present day, so much so that a 2013 European Court of Human Rights judgement specifically identified it as an area in need of reform and a cause of over-crowding (Torreggiani and others v Italy, 2013).​[13]​
Reform has come in the form of a 2014 law (D.L. 26/2014, n. 92) that prohibits the use of preventive custody where the trial judge evaluates that the defendant will receive a suspended sentence or a short sentence. In the latter case, the defendant will now be held under house arrest (art 8). This change simultaneously manifests the persisting punitiveness (measured via incarceration) following from the use of preventive custody. It also manifests the Italian executive and legislative’s willingness to reduce incarceration – willingness to moderation – albeit in response to exogenous (European) pressures. This duality between repression and leniency is also visible in provisions of the 2014 law, as qualifications are placed on the prohibition against precautionary custody and house arrest. The substitution of precautionary custody by house arrest, for example, requires the defendant to have an ‘appropriate abode’ in which to be detained. This condition is likely to prove especially difficult for non-EU migrants, often excluded from alternatives to incarceration precisely because they lack the structural conditions required for access (Solivetti, 2013: 48; Gonnella, 2013: 242)​[14]​.
Article 8 of the 2014 law also does not apply where the defendant is being tried for particularly serious offences such as terrorism, organised crime, crime association or drug trafficking (art 4-bis of law 354/1975). The reform introduces a potential for qualified moderation that replicates the structure of earlier legislation, which also withheld moderation from offenders considered particularly dangerous. ‘Particular danger’ here tends to indicate political attacks against the state. This line of differentiation can be seen in relation to the availability of custodial alternatives in Italy. Indeed, though under the 1975 and 1986 Prison Acts re-socialization and rehabilitation should be a primary aim of punishment  - pursuant to art 27(3) of the Italian Constitution - custodial alternatives geared at these aims may in fact be withheld from offenders such as terrorists and organised criminals. The latter are considered penal subjects whom it is preferable to incapacitate (Cavadino & Dignan, 2006: 144; Ruggiero 1998: 216; see also penal code art 14-bis, art 41-bis and art 4-bis). The only way for such offenders to re-qualify for custodial alternatives is to co-operate with the authorities against their terrorist or organised crime group (Ferrajoli, 1984: 281; Annetta, accessed 2012; Bricola in Rinaldi, 1992: 67; La Greca, 2005; Gonnella, 2013: 230; art 58-ter c.p.). Re-education is thus effectively reserved to those who have asserted their renewed allegiance to the Italian state. 
In sum: penal reforms - past and present - suggest that the potential for punitiveness and moderation co-exist in Italy, and that repression and leniency are unequally distributed. Both are contingent – on the type of crime, or criminal, and the latter’s manifest loyalty to the state. This makes it difficult to categorise Italian penality in terms of unequivocal ‘punitiveness’ or ‘moderation’.

Moderation: deliberate and de facto
I have argued that potential leniency in Italy is represented by the re-educative aims of, and custodial alternatives introduced by, the Prison Acts, and by the Constitutional principle that they embody (but see Ruggiero, 1998; Grande, 2002). Leniency is also, in a sense, what is dispensed by the state when custodial alternatives are re-instated for collaborators. The Italian state thus emerges as determined to monopolise both the power to punish and to forgive. The state’s dispensation of forgiveness is then embodied in clemency provisions, i.e., amnesties and pardons (provisions that are not equally likely in all Western nations, Tonry, 2007: 37). Admittedly, amnesties represent moderation with numerous faces: for example, insofar as they show the state intent on delivering forgiveness, amnesties have a paternalistic face. In this paternalistic form their aim is to act as ‘corrective’ to the harshness of criminal law, pre-empting the ‘short circuit’ provoked in the penal system by an ‘excess [of] penalisation’ (Maiello, 1997: 940). According to Maiello the routine use of amnesties reflects how‘[Italy’s] excess penal legislation has provoked [...] the hypertrophic expansion of a culture of indulgence’ (p. 945), an argument that portrays Italy as a nation with extremes of punitiveness and leniency​[15]​. 
Amnesties are then pragmatic (Pavarini, 2001: 414), as a convenient (if short-term) solution to Italy’s chronic over-crowding problems (Gonnella, 2013: 226-27). Pragmatic was also the use of clemency in response to the political class’ need to obtain electoral consensus (a likely outcome at least until the 1990s: Maiello, 1997: 944). The 1990 reform of the clemency procedure, tightened to require a 2/3 majority in both the chamber of deputies and the senate, was also instrumental and a result of political contingency. The reform was a response to Italy’s 1990s political corruption scandal and was passed to symbolically manifest a return to ‘legality’ by reducing the frequency of clemency provisions. This reduction has been partly achieved, with a 16-year gap between the last two general clemency provisions (Figure 1).  
The dispensation or withholding of clemency thus emerges as pragmatic, and directly susceptible to political contingency. Yet moderation in Italy does not exist only in terms of deliberate political acts of leniency, i.e., acts deliberately designed and deliberately executed in the interest of penal moderation (see Nelken, 2005: 221). Moderation, in the Italian context, is sometimes better understood as de facto moderation: leniency that is, at least formally, the unintended corollary of existing socio-political dynamics. Here Dario Melossi’s notion of ‘hypocritical tolerance’ is invaluable, indicating that in Italy there is some acceptance of deviance (Melossi, 2003:382; Nelken, 2014: 282). The idea of ‘tolerance’ refers to the fact that Italy is a nation beset by ‘widespread illegality’: not high crime rates but a more ‘diffuse and capillary’ phenomenon (Baldissera, 2006: 60 my translation), ‘traditional practices of moderate but pervasive violations of the law’ (Melossi, 2003: 382; Nelken, 2014: 282; also Pavarini, 1994: 50) that are by and large tolerated by the population and to which the Italian elite itself is not immune (Ruggiero, 2010b). Widespread illegality is well exemplified by the high levels of tax evasion and informal labour by which Italy is beset (Regini, 1997: 109; Scamuzzi 1996b: 10). 
In such a context there is ample reliance on informal social controls (Melossi, 2003: 381) though, in keeping with Italy’s differential penality, these may well be reserved to those able to tap into an informal system. Tolerance stops primarily where ‘suitable enemies’ (Wacquant, 1999) are concerned, and immigrants are an example of those for whom informal social controls may not be available and against whom a ‘hypocritical’ insistence on legality may instead be directed (Melossi, 2003). Here we find some explanation for the ‘differentiation’ of punitiveness and moderation across nationality: by contrast to Italians, migrants, as (social and political) ‘outsiders’ are less able to call upon the informal rules by which conflict is resolved (also Solivetti, 2012:148). They thus find the formal law as the main arbiter of their deviance, with formal penal censure as a potential outcome.
Informal social controls are not just a synonym for tolerance of illegality. As Garland reminds us they are also the mode of control associated with traditional institutions such as the family or the church (2001: 89-90). As normative orders in their own right, these institutions may forestall deviance as well as incentivise its ‘informal resolution’ (Barker, 2010: 505). It will of course make a difference whether informal resolution occurs in the context of a community held together by a political subculture, civic associations, and spirit of civic participation (as in Putnam’s characterisation of north central Italy: 1993:103) or in the context of organised crime and its informal norms (Nelken, 2010: 36). Informal conflict resolution in the latter context is likely to be violent and unpredictable; and informality may bring with it an inequality that, in principle, formal law should reduce. Informal social control is therefore a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. If, as I am arguing, Italy possesses a potential for de facto moderation that alternates with the potential for penal repression, the term ‘de facto’ now indicates not just that moderation may not be willed, but also that it may not be the benign counterpart in a simple punitiveness-moderation binary. 
In sum: Italy is a nation neither ‘punitive’ nor ‘moderate’, but both punitive and moderate. Its criminal laws are capable of engendering a repressive potential that expands outwards from its direct targets; insofar as they differentiate between offenders (and detainees) penal provisions also crystallise the split between repression and leniency that appears as a constant in contemporary Italian penality. Italian penality is then split between formality and informality, with formal moderation (clemency) sided by informal moderation (informal resolution of social conflict). Where the latter slides into violent informal resolution of conflict, it is then an example of (non-state inflicted) informal punitiveness (understood here as violent intolerance to deviance from social norms). Italy again appears as a polity that challenges unequivocal penal narratives​[16]​.


State and political economy 
The Italian state – contested authority and intermediate normative orders
In the sections that follow, I analyse how Italy tends to challenge the variables that have been used to explain penal trends: for example, the changing nature of the contemporary state. This discussion provides an explanation for Italy’s dualism between punitiveness and moderation, particularly as it reconnects to the challenges faced by the Italian state. My main theoretical referent here is David Garland who, in The Culture of Control, links contemporary punishment to the waning of the myth of state sovereignty, an integral part of the transition from modernity to late modernity (Garland, 2001: 128 and throughout). If, in modernity, the state had commanded authority and control within its borders - including over crime - in late modernity the state finds itself unable to assert such control - particularly over crime. The response is twofold: adaptive and ‘hysterical’ (Garland, 2001:103-139). The former is a pragmatic response to high crime rates and failing formal social control; the latter is a politicised, populist and expressive response to the same. In its adaptive form the state ‘defines deviance down’, casting crime as a risk of ‘late modern’ life to be circumvented by means of managerial strategies (2001: 181-192). In its hysterical form the state forcibly reasserts its authority via penal coercion and here we find (some of) the roots of contemporary Western punitiveness (2001: 110). 
This narrative of the demise of state sovereignty and its penal consequences is difficult to superimpose upon the Italian reality​[17]​. The difficulty is due partly to the nature of the Italian nation state: not only a ‘late comer’ amongst modern nations, unified only in 1861, but even when unified unable to monopolise authority and control within its borders. For historical reasons – such as the top-down character of Italian unification (Cotta & Verzichelli, 2007: 3-4) and the Catholic Church’s opposition to unification (2007: 5) – the Italian state remained internally contested. It was a state whose ‘ritual power’ was compromised, as was the extent to which it could obtain ‘symbolic investment’ from its citizens (Agnew, 2002: 58). This internal contestation has carried through to contemporary Italy which is still beset by a tension between centre and periphery (Rebuffa, 2007: 15-17; Cassese, 2011) where the centre – the central state – finds itself in competition with its internal component parts – the periphery. 
This contested authority has found violent, political, expression in internal terrorism and organised crime. As such the Italian state seems not to have been ‘modern’ in the sense intended by Garland. According to Garland, one of the characteristics of the process that produced the modern nation state – and its criminal justice institutions – saw the ‘various victorious sovereign lords [involved in the process] hold out the promise of [peace and justice] to their subjects’ (2001:29). This included guaranteeing ‘law and order’, which ‘originally meant the suppression of alternative powers and competing sources of justice as well as the control of crime and disorderly conduct’ (Garland, 2001: 29). By contrast to Garland’s account of modern state building, in Italy the creation of the nation failed to overcome the ‘alternative powers’ threatening its sovereignty (Garland’s narrative is perhaps better suited to more ‘typical’ modern nations such as the UK or France: Lazar, 2013: 321). I suggest that this line of reasoning can be extended to argue that the Italian state also failed to overcome the ‘competing sources of justice’ that existed within its boundaries. 
Terrorism and organised crime have been particularly extreme challenges to the Italian state. However, more moderate, and perhaps more capillary, challenges to the state’s monopoly of authority and control can be found in the many ‘intermediate normative orders’ that populate Italy. These intermediate normative orders can be understood as lato sensu political institutions that stand in between the state and its citizens, and mediate between the two. They are alternative collectivities that may be unified by ‘social class, or belief, or religious practice’ or even ‘kinship and cultural bonds’ (Pizzorno, 1992: 67, my translation). Examples include political parties and their ideologies, such as the Christian Democracy and the Italian Communist Party, Italy’s post-war mass parties. DC and PCI were at one within the State, bolstering the Republic that they had contributed to create and ‘[“educating”] Italian citizens to democratic mass politics’ (Pasquino, 2002: 71), but they were also beyond the State. Their loyalty was not limited to the Italian Republic, but was aimed at the realisation of their ideologies, and ‘long-term ends […] directed to a collectivity that [did] not necessarily coincide with the population living within national boundaries (Pizzorno, 1992: 66; also Nelken on the influence of Catholicism and Marxist ideologies on rights claims in Italy: 2014: 281). Again here we find echoes of Italy’s centre-periphery tension. 
Other ‘intermediate normative orders’ include what Alessandro Pizzorno calls the ‘intermediate stratum’ of the Italian political class: political ‘currents, groups, clienteles, single individuals and their personal following’ (1997: 340, my translation). To this we might add also corruption networks (for which see Pizzorno, 1992; Della Porta, 1992; Ruggiero, 2010b; Della Porta & Vannucci, 2012). Arguably well-rooted families, conceived of as political and economic institutions, may also be seen as intermediate normative orders (Nelken, 1994: 234). 
These intermediate orders point to the Italian state as contested because each order commands allegiance alongside with, if not over and above, the state itself: they are ‘intermediate collective loyalties, institutionally subordinate, but psychologically alternative to loyalty for the state’ (Pizzorno, 1992: 19, my translation). Significantly these intermediate orders can also be understood as presenting internal norms according to which their members interact, and which may or may not coincide with the state’s legal dicta (Rebuffa, 2007: 19; Cassese, 2011: 72). As Nelken argues about the family: ‘some who rely on family (or family-like) connections may feel that they do not need [formal] rights’ (2014: 282). Informal social controls are an offshoot of these intermediate orders, where the latter incentivise informal resolution of social conflict over resort to the criminal law, as in my discussion of Catholic and Left-wing traditions. The choice, informal over formal control, is then possibly reinforced by Italy’s legal delays (Paciotti, 2006, Nelken, 2014: 282) which may make it pragmatic not to rely on formal censure: ‘a strategy adopted by victims who wish to avoid the futile […] resort to the State’s repressive apparatus’ is simply not to report the crime they have suffered (Sgroi, 1996: 28).
 Here the (popular) distinction between ‘real Italy’ and ‘legal Italy’ is useful (Rebuffa, 2007: 16; Cassese, 2011: 72). ‘Legal Italy’ is the nation as imagined by Italy’s laws; ‘real Italy’ is Italy as it operates in fact, including via the myriad of intermediate orders that the nation contains (and by dint of the legal delays that widen the gap between law and its application). The relationship between real and legal ‘Italies’ should be understood as a tension or a dualism, rather than a relationship of mutual exclusivity. Though this tension between ‘law’ and ‘reality’ is present to some extent in all polities (see the distinction between law in the books and law in action), in Italy it is the particular institutional setup that makes the tension so visible. The set-up is one that has been described as proportionalist through and through (Rebuffa, 1996: 156). Rebuffa is here referring to the fact that proportional representation can be found not just in the Italian electoral system (PR until the early 1990s) but also across many elective and political governing bodies, including constitutionally relevant ones​[18]​. Rebuffa’s statement can also be read in a broader fashion: it indicates that the Italian institutional set-up is replete with veto-points, which can be exploited by the nation’s many, conflicting, component groups in a bid to influence power, resource allocation, and decision-making. This set-up incorporates political conflict, without resolving it, and maintains the centre-periphery tension that militates against Italy ever having been a ‘modern’ nation à-la-Garland. The corollary of this argument is that, if Garland’s analysis of the state does not easily apply to Italy, then contemporary Italian penality cannot itself be seen as the penality of a state whose sovereign myth has waned: this myth did not exist in Italy in such terms. 
This is not to say that the criminal law has not been used to impose some semblance of authority upon the inhomogeneous Italian reality. The use of the criminal law against terrorism and organised crime suggests quite the opposite. It may also reflect the tendency of Italian ‘national political culture’ to presume that once legislation exists to regulate a given issue, the issue is thereby automatically resolved (Rebuffa, 2007: 16). This is a ‘legalism’ – an almost utopian belief in the power of law (Reyneri, 1987: 155) – that sees law as a panacea, including in the criminal justice sphere. It is unsurprising then, that Italy displays an over-reliance, and over-inflation of criminal laws (Maiello, 1997:94; Nelken, 2005: 225; 1994: 222) that create (at least) a potential for punitiveness. 
Criminal law in Italy has thus been used as a tool to bolster authority; and the ‘unprotected’ subject of this law may well feel its repressive smart. However this particular use of the law has in fact not been able to achieve the desired cohesion, and state law has continued to co-exist with informal social controls. Some of these still come from what would seem to be the ‘traditional’ institutions whose demise Garland points to as a feature of ‘late modernity’: for example the family or the Church. The institutions that sustain these informal social controls have, of course, been subject to change over time (for the family see Paci, 2009: 288). The Italian post-war mass parties, their ideologies, their subcultures, for example, have all but disappeared. However, it would be a mistake to assume their wholesale demise (for the continuing importance of the family see Nelken, 2014; Ginsborg, 2001 esp at 11; for the persistence of clientelism see Della Porta and Vannucci, 2012: 252; Ruggiero, 2010b; Pasquino, 2002: 67-68). Rather we face a change in their (and with them other intermediate normative orders’) conditions of inclusion. Thus we find that local communities once unified by Catholic and Left wing subcultures (Italy’s ‘white’ and ‘red’ regions​[19]​), with their ‘communitarian’ emphasis on reform and re-education (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006: 140), give way to new, more exclusionary forms of localism​[20]​. These communities persist as intermediate normative orders, particularly where they overlap with political economic arrangements that function on the back of personal trust and kinship relations, as in the ‘industrial districts’ of north-western and central Italy​[21]​. However, those normative orders that had been unified by ideologies are now mainly bereft of these ideologies. Insofar as the latter had been outward-looking, their waning has made the normative orders more inward-looking: functioning primarily in favour of existing members but less permeable to ‘outsiders’ (such as migrants). As time has passed, the conditions of inclusion in (broad) ‘political citizenship’ have changed in Italy, with consequent implications for protection against formal penal censure.
All of which suggests that Italian penality cannot be subsumed into macroscopic accounts of punitive ‘late modern’ states whose sovereignty has waned. Rather what we need is a theoretical framework that allows for a more faceted account of punishment, the state authority it embodies, and the state-citizen relationship it expresses.


The hybrid Italian political economy
If Italy and its state do not fall into accounts of ‘late modernity’, can we identify the Italian political economy as a primary penal determinant? Does Italian penality mimic analyses of ‘post-Fordist’ penality (De Giorgi, 2006)​[22]​? Or, if more variation is required than ‘post-Fordism’ allows, can Italian penality be systematised by reference to different ‘varieties of capitalism’? Certainly The Prisoners Dilemma (Lacey, 2008), with its attention to systematic comparative penal divergence, offers a more useful approach than analyses that presume global political economic homogeneity. However, even taking into account this attention to comparative differences, the answer to the question ‘does the political economy explain Italian penality?’ must be both yes and no. Yes, because political economic variables do play a part in shaping Italian punishment; no, because the Italian political economy is too internally diverse to provide the type of explanatory framework presumed in political economic accounts of punishment. 
The Italian political economy is a hybrid. As such it does not present the level of systemic coherence embodied in the idea of ‘post-Fordism’ as a global economic condition operating above local contexts. Moreover, because of its lack of systemic coherence, Italy also defies the varieties of capitalism (VOC) models. In the political economic literature based on Hall and Soskice’s work, Italy features as neither a liberal-market economy (LME – with the UK as its European archetype), nor as a co-ordinated market economy (CME – with Germany as its European archetype, Hall and Soskice 2001). It is a ‘mixed-market economy’ (MME - Molina and Rhodes, 2007: 223-252), situated between the LME and CME models and possessing elements of both. Italy also presents political economic features best analysed in terms of ‘Southern European’ countries (Ferrera, 1996) that are characterised by ‘organizational fragmentation and politicization of interest associations and the greater role of the state as a regulator and producer of goods’ (Molina and Rhodes, 2007: 228). 
Even this label – MME – with its sensitivity to hybridity, is only one of a number of labels used to characterise the Italian political economy, examples of which include: ‘state market economy’ (though of an anomalous kind – Schimdt and Gualmini, 2013), ‘regionalised capitalism’ (whether divided into ‘three’ or more regions – Bagnasco, 1977; Trigilia and Burroni, 2009), and looking within the regions, the ‘political economy of trust’ (Farrell, 2009).  Common denominators can be found across these categorisations: the hybridity of the Italian political economy; its local differentiation; the particular importance of ‘politics as a strategic asset’ (Molina and Rhodes, 2007: 228), i.e., as means to access channels of decision-making and impose ‘formal or informal vetoes’ upon policy evolution (p. 230) in a fragmented system permeable to vested interest. 
All such features militate against a straightforward correlation between Italy’s political economy and its penality. At its simplest, the problem is one of prediction: where faced with a political economy that is internally diverse, it becomes difficult to construct broad frameworks correlating ‘the’ political economy to punishment. This is not to say that political economic dynamics do not play a role in Italian penality: the distribution of welfare entitlements, or political-economic incentives to reintegration or exclusion of the workforce (Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1939; Melossi and Pavarini, 1977; De Giorgi, 2006 Wacquant, 2009; Lacey, 2008; 2011) certainly influence the highs and lows of Italian punishment​[23]​. The issue is then a methodological one: how can the political economy be our primary ‘independent variable’​[24]​ where it seems to defy (political) economic rationality (Malanima and Zamagni, 2010: 17; Reyneri, 2010: 134; Molina and Rhodes 2007: 228)? 
It is here that we need to find a different organising principle with which to systematise Italian penality: one that allows us to include the influence of the political economy on Italian punishment, without requiring the Italian political economy – or indeed punishment levels – to follow unequivocal trends. In my conclusion I explain why politics – political culture, political dynamics, political institutions – can act as such an organising principle. 

Conclusions: punishment and politics
In this article I have argued that Italy challenges narratives of ‘Western punitiveness’: it does so at the penal level, at the level of state authority, and at the level of the political economy. In terms of punishment, for example, Italy displays neither unequivocal ‘punitiveness’ nor unequivocal ‘moderation’, but a co-existence and alternation of repression and leniency. This dualism is visible throughout Italian penal history, and is crystallised in the peaks and troughs of Italy’s prison rates. 
Likewise, at the level of political authority, Italy possesses a state that is ill suited to narratives of the waning myth of state sovereignty in late modernity. The Italian state has long been beset by a tension between centre and periphery, in response to which it relies on the criminal law to impose homogeneity on a resiliently heterogeneous context, thereby producing a potential for punitiveness. The context is one populated by numerous ‘intermediate normative orders’ whose ‘norms’ need not coincide with formal legal rules. These intermediate orders in fact stimulate the informal social controls with which Italy is replete thereby producing a potential for moderation.
	Heterogeneity is also at the heart of Italy’s challenge to the political economy of punishment. The Italian political economy is fundamentally a hybrid, and lacks the systemic coherence presumed in macroscopic accounts of punishment in ‘post-Fordism’, but also in comparative accounts that explain penal variation by reference to different, yet harmonious, political economic models. This lack of harmony suggests that, though the political economy remains crucial in understanding patterns of punishment, it cannot act as the key organising principle in systematising Italian penality. For such a systematisation we need to look elsewhere, namely to politics.
	 Why do I contend that politics can be the key organising principle for Italian penality? Looking across Italian penal trends, the Italian state and the Italian political economy, the importance of political dynamics, culture, and institutions, appears as a common denominator throughout. This is most explicit in my analysis of the Italian state and the intermediate normative orders that challenge its authority. ‘Political’ is the question of state authority, but also the expression of this authority (or lack thereof) within the criminal justice sphere (see Miller, 2013: 300). The issue here is one of the relationship between state and citizen, as it links to the criminal law’s purchase and role. Political is the state’s attempt to impose cohesion via penal legislation, and its distribution of clemency. So are the dynamics that lead Italian citizens to prefer informal normative orders over formal legal rules particularly where sustained by political ideologies. 
What can we learn from Italy about contemporary penality and its contextual variation? In answer to this question I argue that Italy helps bring into focus the relationship between politics and punishment (see also Miller, 2013; Barker, 2013, 2007; Lacey and Soskice, 2013; Loader and Sparks, 2013; Dzur, 2010; Lappi-Seppälä, 2008). The Italian case highlights the impact, on punishment, of political structures, the political values that inhabit these structures, and the historical evolution of both.
The point I make throughout the article is in part a methodological one, aimed at identifying an explanatory framework with which to make sense of Italian punishment (rather than simply cataloguing its particularities) and thereby set it in conversation with existing theories of Western punishment. My ‘methodological contention’ is most immediately illustrated by looking at the Italian political economy: I have argued that, amongst the features common to characterisations of Italy’s political economy, is the importance of ‘politics as a strategic asset’ in the shaping of economic policy. If no direct link can be found between the hybrid political economy and penal policy, we may nonetheless link the two by investigating how politics have constrained the political economy and the penal incentives thought to follow. This is, in fact, a fruitful method to understand Italian punishment as a whole. The importance of ‘politics as a strategic asset’ is visible across Italian policy domains, as Italy is a society both politicized and fragmented, and the Italian institutional structure is replete with veto-points. It is therefore a reasonable hypothesis that those interest groups capable of exploiting these veto points, may exert significant influence on Italian policy. This includes penal policy, but also policy capable of indirectly influencing penality, such as welfare and economic policy (Beckett and Western, 2001). 
If this hypothesis is correct then we may achieve a systematisation of Italian penality by focusing on political institutions: ‘the institutional and administrative organization of the state’, that shapes how political and policy decisions are made (Barker, 2009: 36; Lacey, 2008; Savelsberg, 1994; 1999). The approach implies that we look at the structure of Italian political institutions, and their historical development under the influence of different political parties and cultures. It implies that we investigate who has access to these political institutions – which interests but also which citizens. It also suggests that we reflect upon what this access tells us about the relationship between state and citizens in Italy, and how reliance on informal means of political participation may be incentivised where formal participation is barred or ineffectual.
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